In his interesting and provocative paper Schwartz contends "that anthropology has not had the impact it should on mainstream psychology." In this comment I shall limit myself to "mainstream academic psychology," leaving aside the somewhat different relationship between anthropology and psychiatry, and, particularly, psychoanalysis. These need to be discussed separately because of the alienation that exists between psychology, including clinical and personality psychology, and both psychiatry and psychoanalysis in this country. Also, I wish to limit the discussion to the history of the contacts between the disciplines in the United States.

The relationship between anthropology and mainstream academic psychology is a problem in the anthropology and sociology of knowledge; it requires an extensive look at the history of these disciplines and at the institutional structures within which they have operated.

Evidence in support of Schwartz' contention is not hard to find. A recent centennial review of psychology (Kessen and Cahan 1986) mentions a variety of intellectual contacts and influences, but
anthropology is not among them. A lengthy review of the history of the relationship between psychology and anthropology was presented by A. I. Hallowell in John Gillin's 1954 volume entitled *For a Science of Social Man*. This book represents the high point of an optimistic mood in which it seemed possible to lay the groundwork for some theoretical coming together of anthropology, psychology and sociology. Writing more than 30 years ago, Hallowell expected the greatest influence to come from psychology, with regard to four areas: personality theory and personality tests, learning theory, social psychology, and human nature.

M. Brewster Smith, in the same volume, argues that anthropology "has had stronger affinity with psychiatry and psychoanalysis than with hard core academic psychology" (1954:37) and comments that "In psychology, students in personality and social psychology, who comprised most of those who paid attention to anthropological developments, were perforce bucking the currents of methodological rigor in concerning themselves with these treacherous areas." The emphasis on what is taken to be methodological rigor can only be
said to have increased in academic psychology in the intervening years.

Textbooks offer one source of information into what is considered "mainstream" in an academic discipline. Thus, in 1947, Newcomb and Hartley edited a volume of *Readings in Social Psychology* for the Committee on the Teaching of Social Psychology of the Society for the Study of Social Issues. It includes 13 selections by anthropologists. In 1958, the 3rd edition of this very successful reader (Maccoby, Newcomb and Hartley 1958) included only three. In their Preface to the Third Edition, the editors point to the changes their field had undergone: group dynamics, public opinion, and person perception had become specialized subfields. Also, they say, "Publications have become more specialized...with more use of technical statistics, abstract symbols and specialized terminology and rigorous experimental design" (1958:vii). By 1961, Bert Kaplan's edited interdisciplinary volume *Studying Personality Cross-culturally* represented a rear-guard action.

It is precisely the developments noted by the editors of the 3rd edition of the *Reader* that have increased the distance between mainstream psychology and anthropology. Psychology wanted to be tough and
anthropology was said to be soft. A similar perception existed within anthropology with regard to personality and culture said to be soft in contrast to some other trends in anthropology.

There appears to have been a general decline of interest in anthropology by mainstream psychologists ("hard-core" in Smith's terms) from a high point in the '40s to mid-50s. This has, in part, paralleled the decline of personality and culture within anthropology. Thus, the high water mark for interdisciplinary cooperation between psychology and anthropology centered about World War II. The discovery of psychological perspectives on other cultures and that of culture as a factor in the behavior of people represented matters of interest. Psychological warfare and the need to understand enemies and allies, as well as to mobilize the homefront appear relevant to an assessment of the period.

America's turning in on itself in the '50s, the retreat from cultural relativism—however defined—and claim of "methodological rigor" as defense mechanism against the perception of undesirable knowledge came to the fore throughout the social sciences. Paradoxically, the current new relativism of the interpretive orientation in anthropology, as Spiro
(1986) has pointed out, is reducing the perception of the relevance of anthropology, rather than enhancing it as relativism once did. Since the mid-'50s a cross-cultural psychology has developed. However, this is not mainstream psychology and has not been integrated into psychology curricula. Some of its roots are to be found in Third World industrial and child psychology. Moreover, testing of hypotheses, Piagetian or other, in non-Western societies, by itself and in isolation hardly constitutes an anthropologically informed approach. As Schwartz points out, too often there is "cross-cultural" without "cultural."

Four review articles on cross-cultural psychology or an aspect of this subdiscipline have appeared in Annual Reviews in Psychology, the first, "Psychology and Culture" by Triandis Malpass, and Davidson, was published in 1973. The authors of this initial article focus for the most part on work done in the '60s and early '70s and state that they could cover only a quarter of the articles dealing with the connection between culture and psychology. The emphasis in this review is on testing the universality of basic psychological processes, and occasionally there is evidence that the effect of culture is not fully realized. For example,
in discussing the 1969 Caudill and Weinstein study of Japanese and American maternal and infant behavior, the authors conclude by saying that no differences were found in the frequency of feeding" on which there is no reason to expect cultural differences" (p. 368). However, the cross-cultural method of Whiting & Child (1953) and the study of cross-cultural perception by Herskovits and others (1966) receive attention in this article, and the work of several other anthropologists is mentioned in passing.

A second review article, "What's Cultural about Cross-Cultural Cognitive Psychology?" by the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, was published in 1979. The authors look at the literature on the most commonly studied problems in culture and cognition from 1973 to 1978 dividing the studies four classes: universal hypotheses, socialization theories, "mixed", approaches and ethnographic-psychological approaches. They conclude that in the studies reviewed culture is represented only superficially. The article cities several anthropologists, but the reference mode to them is brief.

Brislin sets a more optimistic tone in his 1983 review article as he notes the proliferation of handbooks, journals books and articles on cross-
cultural psychology. He cites as one of the most notable occurrences in 1979-1983, the period under review, "the breakdown in mutual name calling and the number of sophisticated analyses combining the efforts of psychologists and anthropologists..."(p.364), and he mentions in his conclusion the mutual enrichment between the two disciplines. Brislin draws on definitions of culture from anthropology and mentions a few names of anthropologists, but his article seem to reflect an ideal view of the relationship between psychology and anthropology.

Segall brings us down to earth with his 1986 review "Culture and Behavior: Psychology in Global Perspective" which covers the period from 1980 to 1985. He reports a concern within cross-cultural psychology for an understanding of what culture is and how the concepts of emic and ethic affect research, but in spite of this concern Segall states, "Indeed, in a review of the literature that led up to the present chapter, it once again became clear that culture per se is not a variable. Hardly any contemporary research report explain a behavior as a product of 'culture'”. Further on he comments that empirical research is unaffected by definitions of the concept of culture, emic or ethic, and that research is considered to be
cross-cultural if it involves diverse places, comparable behaviors and tested psychological concepts and instruments (p. 528). He cites anthropologists only when their research led to that by cross-cultural psychologists, and although he sees anthropology and psychology as having interests in common at the point at which culture and behavior meet, culture in many of the psychological studies he cites does not seem to be seen as a system and although the concept of context is mentioned, it is interpreted rather narrowly.

These four reviews of cross-cultural psychology show that even within the most promising area of shared domain between anthropology and psychology - that of culture and behavior - the anthropological concept of culture has not had a strong effect on psychological research. Regretfully the evidence from textbooks, handbooks and review articles on psychological topics other than cross-cultural shows even less influence from anthropology. As Segall states in reference to psychological studies in general, "Despite the steady growth of 'cross-cultural psychology," the preponderance of contemporary psychological research is still designed, conducted and interpreted as if culture did not matter" (1986:524). For example, the fifth edition of a popular introductory textbook, James V.
McConnell's *Understanding Human Behavior* (1986), makes almost no mention of anthropologists or their work. Even the ubiquitous Margaret Mead is mentioned only once, when a minor remark by her about fatherhood is rebutted. Cross-cultural references are rare, and the subfield of cross-cultural psychology is not mentioned by name—not even in a closing chapter which indicates new developments in psychology.
Handbooks in psychology vary in their anthropological input. The six volume *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (1980) covers methodology, basic processes, developmental psychology and psychopathology. Ralph Beals in his 1982 account of anthropology as he has experienced it comments on "the almost complete omission of anthropologists..." (p. 21) from this handbook. An example of a handbook with a chapter showing a strong anthropological perspective is *Handbook of the Psychology of Aging* (1985) to which anthropologist Christine Fry contributes "Culture, Behavior, and Aging in the Comparative Perspective."

Authors of articles in *Annual Review of Psychology* - other than those writing review articles on cross-cultural psychology - seldom cite the work of anthropologists or even that of their colleagues in psychology who do cross-cultural research. In a 1979 *Annual Review of Psychology* article by Jean Piaget titled "Relations Between Psychology and Other Sciences," the sciences mentioned are biology, logico-mathematical disciplines, cybernetics, physics and the human sciences - linguistics (psycho-linguistics is "a pledge of collaboration that is full of promise" p. 5), economics ("two examples of intersections with psychology are game theory and praxeology), and
sociology (relations have not been a good as with linguistics and economics except for the work of Talcott Parsons). Anthropology is not included.

An exception is a 1985 review article, "Sex and Gender" by Kay Deaux, who, while she focuses on psychological literature, does begin and end her article with acknowledgments that the topic demands an interdisciplinary approach, and she does cite anthropologists.

The present gap between the disciplines exists in teaching and research, in sense of problem and in methodology. Seeking universal laws of animal behavior, choosing experimental species--from pigeons to monkeys to freshmen--for research convenience, allows little room for interest in cultural diversity. The very fact that our psychological colleagues speak of "human subjects" and "running Ss", and that much of what anthropologists are interested in the behavior of their informants is extraneous to the type of controlled study they conduct, speaks to the point.

In addition to considering purely intellectual factors that render what we have to contribute unpalatable there are also institutional factors. Here I have in mind the growing trend of academic administrations to seek increasingly definitions of
disciplines in terms of what is "mainstream," by rewarding publication in a narrow range of journals, for example. Rewards range from tenure and promotion to salary increments. Perhaps computerization can be blamed for some of this; certainly the concern with litigation and the elimination of any human judgment in the evaluation of the work of colleagues seems to be pertinent to this restrictive trend, though it cloaks itself in a concern for excellence.

One final point should be mentioned and that is that we are suffering the failure of success. Key terms of our vocabulary, including "culture," "ethnography," and "cross-cultural" have been taken over not only by the popular media but also by a series of other disciplines, from education to communication, from business management to journalism and even, at times, by psychology. In becoming trendy, the words have been emptied of their meaning. We do well to be concerned.