What is Psychological Anthropology?

INTRODUCTION: WHEN ONE CHILD HITS ANOTHER

Children pass in front of our house on their way to and from school. On occasion, some of them fight. We hear voices raised in anger and complaint; one child is hitting another. Two children are chasing each other. One falls, then runs again. The group moves on and the street is quiet until the next few children come along.

Could this scene occur anywhere in the world where children walk to school? If it happens to take place on a residential street in a middle-sized city in the midwestern United States in the late 1970s what is peculiar about it? How does it reflect this particular time and place? How is it part of U.S. culture? And how does it interest the psychological anthropologist?

We can answer these questions best by contrasting our scene with one observed in another part of the world. In Peyrane, a village in southern France, two boys are quarreling. They insult and threaten each other fiercely. Finally one of them strikes the other with his fist. Then he runs away. The other boy makes a brief pretense of chasing him, then goes off.

Here is one more scene, from a third culture. In the mountains of Haiti, two children are walking along a path. They are a girl of seven or eight and a boy of about six. She is hitting him vigorously as they walk along, berating him, and calling him names. He is wailing and complaining loudly, trying to shield himself against her blows, but making no attempt to hit back.

What are the differences between these scenes, and how are they related to the differences in culture and in personality in these three societies?

Let us start with our last example first: what is going on here? Why, for example, does the boy not hit back? When we inquire about this scene, we find
that the girl is the boy's older sister, and their mother has put her in charge. He has been disobedient and she is punishing him, as their mother might. They are not equals. She is older, and he, therefore, owes her respect and obedience. She may strike him with full authority to discipline him; he must not strike back. Hitting an older sister is almost as wicked as hitting one's mother, and, informants say, it is a sin to be repented, one to be admitted in confession to the Catholic priest.

What about the French children? Laurence Wylie, who studied the village of Peyrane, tells us:

If two children start to fight they are immediately separated by any adult who may happen to witness the scene . . . If it is relatives who separate fighting children, both children are punished. No inquiry is made into the question of which child started the fight or which was in the right. They are both fighting and consequently they are both guilty (Wylie 1974:49–50).

This attitude is expressed in the proverbial saying “jeu de mains, jeu de vilains,” which greets youngsters observed in rough-and-tumble play. It says that those engaged in rough physical contact play will come to no good.

Wylie goes on to note that adults in Peyrane “will never punish a child for insulting another child.” When the children he observed quarreled, “threats of violence were fierce, and the violence rarely occurred.” A boy who was struck might chase after the attacker, but he might also cry and run away to seek adult help. Wylie remarks that he never observed a fight that got beyond “the one-blow stage.”

Clearly, French parents discourage physical aggression in their children, but allow verbal aggression as an outlet for anger. The behavior of the adults is a model in this regard, for they themselves may on occasion make a great public show of anger in words and threats, but physical fighting is said to be rare.

What of the first example, children in the United States? Physical fighting is engaged in freely. Unlike the French children, they do not run away to seek adult help, and I have never seen an adult intervene. Boys fight among themselves, and at times also boys and girls will hit each other. Traditionally, there are differences in fighting styles between the sexes, but more recently I have seen little girls swing their fists, as boys do.

These observations relate to other aspects of each culture: the first example illustrated an emphasis on self-reliance and independence in children. Adults do not interfere. Aggression is expressed physically among children, as it is frequently in the adult society. School is coeducational and so is social interaction, including fighting. Sex differences are increasingly deemphasized, and little girls and boys learn to fight, as well as to play, alike.

In the United States we strongly value self-reliance and independence and consider that physical fighting, in the form of appropriate self-defense, represents important training. This attitude is illustrated forcefully in yet another scene. In
boy striking his mother will be thought to be manly! In the Haitian case, furthermore, the age hierarchy is reinforced by religious sanctions: hitting your older sister is a sin. This is a system in which there are no equals. Everyone is either above you or below you in rank.

The French examples, too, show a stress on obedience: "you must not fight" is a fixed injunction. "Who is right" and "who started it" are irrelevant questions. At the same time, value is placed on verbal skills, on the ability to express feelings in dramatic and colorful language. The same value appears in the farming village of Peyrane and among more highly educated people of the large towns and cities. As Martha Wolfenstein points out, in the context of observations in Paris:

What French children learn is not the prized Anglo-Saxon art of self-defense or the rules that determine a fair fight. What they learn is that their own aggression is not permissible. A consequence of the prohibition against physical aggression is that verbal disputes are substituted for it (Wolfenstein 1963:105).

In small scenes of aggressive interaction among children in four settings we have found a series of striking differences. Not only is the behavior of the children different, but the action sequences are embedded in larger contexts. They are linked, in other words, to important differences in the total cultures. Furthermore, by the age of six or seven, these children already express their own cultures. Children in the United States do not seek adult help; they fight their own fights. This is both a descriptive statement and a normative one. Johnny in Peru is exposed to contradictory pressures. His father, living in a foreign country, seems to feel the need for strong measures not only to impress the traditional values on his son but also to teach him to defend himself in an unfriendly environment. French children know that if they strike and are caught they will be punished; the aggressor therefore runs away. The Haitian child knows that if she—more rarely he—is assigned child-care duties, they involve both the responsibilities and the right to enforce rules. At seven, these children act differently in roughly comparable situations.

We also find that they feel differently about themselves and others. Youngsters in the United States might feel satisfac tion at having stood up for their rights. They have been encouraged by parents not to let others "push them around,"2 not to be a "crybaby" or a "sissy." They may brag at having taken on the class bully or a youngster who was older or bigger. They have been told to fight their own battles and cannot run to adults for help. A child that does may not only be ridiculed by peers but rebuffed by adults as well. Fighting, then, is part of gaining mastery. Besides, adults see it as a normal part of emotional release, as implied in the quotation from Wolfenstein, an observer from the United States looking at French children. The French child might feel guilty about having broken the rule against fighting; this child has learned, on the whole, to control physical aggressivity and instead to give vent to emotions in forceful words. One child in Peyrane explained how it feels to be teased at school:

It makes me want to run after him and show him what's what, but what I really do is to go off into a corner and yell at him, "you wait and see after school. You'll see what happens. You won't go home with your nose in the right place." It's all right to get angry when someone teases you, but there is no excuse for fighting . . . . (Wylie 1974:199).

The Haitian child has learned that anger is best vented against someone younger or lower in the social hierarchy, a dog, if need be. Haitian society is organized along lines of hierarchy, so that, at least in theory, an adult man may be beaten by his father. Since overt aggression can be legitimately directed only against inferiors, hostility against others must be expressed by more subtle means, which range from gossip to sorcery.

F. L. K. Hsu has written:

What we in anthropology need is to deduce premises or postulates about the human condition from the characteristic patterns of affect of each society and culture . . . . Human beings do not feel the same in diverse societies about their fellow humans, their gods, and objects, and in the long run such differences will find expression in their individual and group behavior (Hsu 1978a:7).

As we have seen in our brief examples, such differences in how people feel about each other and about themselves are established early in life, as are the differences in ways of expressing feelings in behavior. Indeed, we started out with examples of behavior and saw that they can be understood only in larger contexts. Culture is a system; it is a puzzle that consists of many interlocking pieces. We can, apparently, start virtually anywhere, with any piece of the puzzle, and if we seek to understand it fully, we will have worked our way through the whole system before we are through.

That group differences in behavior exist is a commonsense observation. Psychological anthropology attempts to discover how such differences come about, and how they are related to other aspects of social life. It also explores basic, underlying similarities among human beings, which set limits to the range of differences and variations that we observe. Both these differences and the underlying unity will be the subject of this book. A great deal has been written about these matters in the past fifty years. We shall see how these and related problems have been approached by anthropologists, and in some instances, by other students of human behavior. We shall try to learn what has been discovered, what methods of research have proven fruitful, and what new questions have emerged in the process.

Our frame of reference throughout will be cross-cultural, that is, we shall keep in mind that our society is only one of many and our way of life a special, local
A WIDER FRAMEWORK

As members of a single species all human beings past and present share a common human nature; yet this common humanity of billions of unique individuals finds its expression in a great range of diverse cultures. The fascination of anthropology resides in the apparent paradox: such a great variety of traditional patterns solves a common set of problems by utilizing common human capacities. A shared human nature has given rise to, is expressed in, and is filtered through a multitude of unique and divergent cultures.

For psychological anthropology, with its emphasis on human behavior and dispositions toward behavior, some aspects of this paradox have been of particular interest. As we take a brief look at the historical background of our subdiscipline we shall see that emphases and concerns have varied over time, and that different paths have been taken by individual investigators. As a result, to assess the field as a whole, we shall have to review a sizable number of approaches and areas of subject matter; yet all point to a small number of key discoveries.

Some of these discoveries are so well established now that it comes as a surprise to realize how recent their acceptance has been. For example, it is generally agreed that the human capacity for culture evolved over time, and that we can see its roots in the animal species that are most closely akin to our own, the living great apes. There are continuities in needs, behaviors, and capacities between ourselves and related life forms. Yet, with its fully developed cultural mode of existence, Homo sapiens is unique. Similarities and differences must both be understood, if we are to gain a balanced view of our species. We are not "naked apes," nor are we the product of a separate and special creation. We are, rather, the result of an evolutionary process in which we share distant, but common ancestors with the great apes. What is unique about humanity evolved among species that are now extinct, and of which we have only fragmentary evidence.

We have also learned that the cultural mode of life must be studied not only to make an inventory of objects and customs, nor to evaluate the success of an adaptive response. Such approaches are surely valid in their own right, but they cannot tell the whole story. Differences among human groups are to be found not only in the utilization of the environment, in the objects they make and employ, and in the things they do, but also in what they say and think and feel. There may even be differences in how they think and how they perceive the world about them. As a result, we come to see that culture is not merely an external factor or the "man-made part of the human environment," but part and parcel of people's personalities and of their very selves. From birth, indeed from conception, a series of interacting processes takes place: physiological development, growth, and maturation; and language acquisition, cognitive development, personality development, and the learning of cultural ways, often termed socialization. They are all aspects of a single continuous process, which we separate for purposes of analysis only. In the course of this process, culture is "built into" us—it cannot be put on and taken off like a suit of clothes—and we learn much that we are not aware of learning. Moreover, although as individuals we may know some of our own habits or preferences, we often are not able to articulate the regularities that observers refer to as the "culture" of our group.

Culture is learned, or more accurately, in Edward Sapir's phrase, "gradually and gropingly discovered" by each individual in the process of growing up (Sapir 1949 [orig. 1934]:596). It is not handed down complete and fully shaped from generation to generation. It is constantly reworked and reformulated. This fact is true of all human groups, however traditional and conservative.

One of the major discoveries of anthropology in the course of the last century has been precisely the importance of learning in the development of culture, and hence the potential for transformation of individuals and groups. Culture is acquired through learning and experience; it is not inherited in the individual's genetic makeup. The migrations of millions of people to the Americas and the radical transformations that have taken place all over the globe since the end of World War II, for example, all show that cultural changes are a great deal faster than genetic changes. Indeed, the fastest biological changes result from interbreeding among peoples of different ancestral stocks, itself a by-product of social and cultural processes, such as wars and migrations.

Race and Culture

The emphasis on distinctions between culture and learning, on the one hand, and "race" and biology, on the other, is one of the major achievements of twentieth century anthropology, and of U.S. anthropology in particular. A confusion between the two often arises, as M. J. Herskovits pointed out long ago in his epoch-making discussions of the importance of the African background of Afro-Americans, as a result of the fact that we learn certain aspects of behavior without our being aware of them. They are not consciously taught, but we pick them up through imitation and identification with models. Herskovits (1966 [orig. 1945]: 59) speaks of cultural imponderables that are "carried below the level of consciousness." Among them he includes linguistic patterns, musical style, motor habits, systems of values, and codes of etiquette. We might add control or freedom of emotional expression within a cultural style, voice quality and speech rhythms, gesture patterns and dance styles, and so on. Often such features of behavior are ascribed to "race" in popular usage, whether by members of the groups themselves, or by outsiders. Sometimes these racially tagged behaviors are praised and positively valued; sometimes they are part of a low evaluation of a given group.
During the 1930s David Efron (1941) studied differences in gesture patterns among several so-called “racial” groups in New York City: traditional East European Jews, traditional Italians, and Americanized East European Jews and Italians. The gesture patterns of the two traditional groups differed dramatically, although both punctuated their conversations with the active use of their hands. The acculturated groups gestured much less and approximated the U.S. non-gesture norm. These findings were interpreted as showing that specific patterns of gestures were part of the cultural heritage of each of the traditional groups. As a different cultural pattern came to be accepted by certain members of these groups, gestures changed, as did language, clothing, and other items of the cultural inventory. The differences in gesture patterns were not part of a “racial” or biological difference between these two ethnic groups, nor between them and older Americans.

Culture, including gesture patterns and speech habits, may change rapidly under appropriate circumstances, without having to wait for slow biological changes to take place. In making such a remark, we generally have in mind that people who, as the phrase has it, were “living in the Stone Age” only a few years ago, are now driving cars or working in factories, while their children are attending universities. However, rapid cultural borrowing and acquisition may be illustrated by other cases as well. For example, when the Spaniards lost their hold on their South American Empire in 1824, many Spanish soldiers remained behind. Some historians have it that these soldiers had sided with the colonists, and others claim that Spain simply did not repatriate a major portion of its army. Whatever the truth may be, in the Peruvian highlands, about the town of Ayacucho, there still live so-called “white Indians”: people whose features give evidence of their Spanish ancestry, but whose clothes, speech, and general patterns of behavior make them indistinguishable from their “pure” Indian neighbors.

The notion of “race” that is used when people attribute behavioral characteristics of groups to their biological identity also deserves closer scrutiny. Let us compare the race classification in use in Latin America with that which holds sway in the United States. For example, in this country, even in government guidelines for affirmative action programs, only a small number of terms are used: white, black, oriental, Native American. In Latin America, on the other hand, the list includes a large number of labels for intermediate groups, such as mestizos, mulatos, and zambos. Marvin Harris (1970) found that Brazilians use more than a dozen different terms, many of which have no North American equivalents. Furthermore, there is little agreement among individuals in assigning these labels, and a variety of social factors are used in placing people into what purport to be “racial” categories.

These striking differences in the classification of “races” among modern societies has an important implication: when people talk about “racial” differences in ability, aptitude, or personality, they are, in fact, not talking about biologically distinct groups at all. Rather, the terms they use are labels for social groupings recognized in the society.

Terms for Our Field

Interest in the interrelations between culture and personality began to develop in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. In the years just before and during World War II, research in this field grew into a scientific fad. Since then, other fads and trends have come and gone, but culture-and-personality studies have become a standard part of the anthropology curriculum in U.S. colleges and universities. As the faddish aspect of this research area waned, approaches have diversified and the scope of interest in the psychological ramifications of anthropology has increased. Because of these innovations, it has, at times, been claimed that “culture and personality” is dead. However, as George Spindler (1978a) has noted, various “dismal diagnoses” of the field were unwarranted and numerous “obituaries” were premature. Instead, he points to the great current vitality of what he calls “psychologizing anthropology,” that is, the application of psychological approaches to anthropological problems and data.

Reference is now most often made to “psychological anthropology” as a subfield of cultural anthropology. At least two of the original concerns of culture-and-personality research have acquired the status of independent specializations and now often are treated as separate areas of study: the comparative, cross-cultural study of mental health and mental illness and the comparative, cross-cultural study of child rearing. The former is, at present, frequently a part of programs of medical anthropology or of transcultural psychiatry; the latter is sometimes linked to training in educational anthropology.
The terms “culture and personality” and “psychological anthropology” will both be used in this book. The first will refer to the somewhat narrower range of concerns that were the principal subject of the original field of study bearing that label. The second will cover a much larger area that includes, among other topics, such current interests of anthropologists as studies in perception and cognition. This subject has concerned social psychologists for a long time. We shall see, however, that there are important differences in the ways in which the two disciplines approach topics in which they appear to have common interests.

In this book, we shall cast a wide net, to provide the reader with a broad view of our field. Our perspective will be cross-temporal as well as cross-cultural. That is, we shall deal with behavioral evolution, cultural evolution, and the psychological relevance of culture change, as well as with comparative, cross-cultural investigations. We shall be concerned primarily with work that has been carried out by anthropologists, but at times we shall refer to the research and writing of colleagues in neighboring fields. Our emphasis will be on research among peoples of diverse traditions yet occasionally we shall find examples closer to home. Since the aim of examples is to reveal principles, readers may well find other examples, from their own experiences, to enlarge on the issues raised in these pages.

PSYCHOLOGY VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Since both psychology and psychological anthropology study human behavior, we might expect a great deal of overlap between these two disciplines. What, then, makes psychological anthropology, and the narrower field of culture and personality, different? How does our approach as anthropologists differ from that of our colleagues in social psychology or, let us say, child psychology?

One difference is obvious: the sociologist and the psychologist in the United States are most likely to study behavior here, although this generalization is certainly much less true today than it was twenty or twenty-five years ago. So-called “primitive,” “tribal,” or “traditional” societies are to a large extent still left for the anthropologist to investigate. Nowadays some students of the behavioral sciences are emulating European and Third World scholars who are increasingly engaged in social psychological research in Third World areas. How lively this interest is at present is shown, for example, by the multivolume Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Triandis, Brislin, and Dragoons 1979). We shall consider this area of research in some detail in Chapter 6. On the other hand, anthropologists in the United States are slowly beginning to address themselves to studies of their own society, or segments of that society, so that they too are reducing what has traditionally been one of the distinctive features of their discipline. As a result, the difference between the anthropologist and other social and behavioral scientists no longer lies primarily in the choice of the people among whom they carry on their research. It is at best only a superficial distinction. More important differences between cultural an-

thropology and psychology in the United States today lie in the formulation of research problems and in the methods used to investigate them.

It is true that the choice of location for their research no longer distinguishes anthropologists as clearly from their academic neighbors as it once did. Yet, historically, this choice played an important role. It had a significant impact on the development of the several disciplines, on the problems they investigate, and the methods they employ. As a result, the anthropologist keeps a characteristic basic orientation, implicit if not explicit: a concern with comparison. In asking what life is like among Haitian peasants, Ojibwa Indians, or U.S. college students, there is, for the anthropologist, an implicit comparison with other peoples studied at first hand or through the reports of others. This is one reason why fieldwork, particularly in an unfamiliar setting, is such an important part of the training of the cultural anthropologist. The comparisons, then, are cross-cultural; the study of any given group, however interesting it may be, is not an end in itself but a contribution to our knowledge of humanity throughout its history. We ask how the universal human problems are dealt with by a given group, within a given historical and ecological context.

Variations among societies and cultures, great as they may be, fall within limits set by the human psychobiological equipment, the constraints of social life, and the relations between human societies and their environmental settings that we call cultural ecology. Culture, then, may be seen as a variable system of solving constant problems. It is not a random aggregate of traits and complexes fortuitously acquired by a given human society, but a more or less flexible and changing system or structure of more or less congruent elements.

Such a comparative view of culture is directly related to the anthropologist’s second orientation, which is also comparative: toward discovering what is generically and specifically human. This concern involves a comparison among species within the framework of behavioral evolution. Rather than asking how behavior among the Navajo is different from behavior among the Trobriand Islanders, we ask: how is behavior in groups of a given primate species, say the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) different from behavior among groups of Homo sapiens? And how do we account for these differences?

Although psychologists also study the behavior of other animal species as well as of humans, they do not as a rule address themselves to the problem of the evolution of behavior. They are more likely to be concerned with similarities in the behavior they study rather than with differences; for example, with regard to principles of learning, they work as readily with dogs or pigeons as with monkeys or college freshmen.

Similarly, cross-cultural comparisons are not basic to the orientation of most psychologists in the United States who study human social behavior; indeed, the presence of cultural factors is likely to be given scant attention, and the psychologist’s approach is likely to be focused much more narrowly. To cite an example at random: a textbook edited by two social psychologists carries the broad title Human Behavior. But this topic is narrowed by a more specific subtitle, A
Contemporary View of Experimental Research (Baron and Liebert, 1971). The editors might have further added: by U.S. social psychologists working with U.S. subjects. When we look at typical papers in this collection, we find that the subjects were small numbers of Americans, identified as forty-eight undergraduates in a psychology course, forty-eight children between the ages of three and five, sixty-six high school males, and so on. We are told very little about them. Specific hypotheses about human social behavior are formulated and tested with these subjects. No consideration is given to the possibility that U.S. culture, or some aspects of it, or some specific cultural attributes of this or that particular group of subjects might be relevant to their performance in the test situation. The anthropologist might ask: would the expectation expressed in the hypothesis be equally probable for a different cultural group—Eskimos or Tungus? Mbuti pygmies or Haitian peasants? Even in the United States, would it hold equally true of a different age group? Of people at a different educational or class level? Is ethnic membership relevant? In other words, how broadly can the results of these experiments be generalized to human social behavior? Writing in a different context, the psychologist W. K. Estes has described this situation in the following terms: “The main harvest of psychological research has been a vast collection of facts and local principles that are largely specific to particular types of people in particular situations.” (Estes 1975:649).

A second difference between psychological anthropology and psychology involves methodology. The research of the psychologist is, as a rule, experimental and statistical, involving the formulation and testing of hypotheses, the building of experimental apparatus, the contriving of situations in the laboratory, and the setting up of specifically predefined, controlled conditions. A good deal of effort and imagination goes into the development of such experiments. The work of the anthropologist, by contrast, is most typically concerned with natural situations, with "field research." These are situations over which the investigator is likely to have only minimal control, although—in personality assessment in particular—various psychological experimental and testing procedures often have been attempted. This anthropological emphasis on comparative field research holds whether we deal with studies in cultural anthropology, where participant observation and interviewing play a prominent role, or with primate studies, where ethological research—the observation of animal behavior in the animals' natural habitat—is of key importance. In either case the field rather than the laboratory is the anthropologist's primary workshop.

Thus, whereas psychologists tend to look for regularities that cut across differences among groups, even among species, anthropologists tend to compare. They look for both similarities and differences. And rather than utilizing experimental procedures, anthropologists are likely to attempt to understand a specific set of behaviors within the larger context of the culture. This search for a context, this claim that behavior can be understood only when we know how it fits into the larger cultural and social situation, has been called "holism." Holism, too, distinguishes the anthropological from the psychological approach. In part, too, holism is related to fieldwork, for in the anthropologist's experience there is the field-worker's total immersion in an alien culture. By contrast, the psychologist's laboratory provides a contrived situation, part of whose artificiality resides precisely in the fact that it is not related to a larger sociocultural context, except that of the research itself.

Anthropologists, then, carry on much of their research by doing fieldwork in alien societies, approaching these societies holistically. Generally, they do not carry on experiments, but seek to understand the behavior they observe from the point of view of the people observed; and they view their own research within a comparative framework. Psychologists, on the other hand, typically look for regularities, and carry on experiments to test hypotheses. They work in carefully controlled, contrived situations. As a result, when anthropologists and psychologists claim to be dealing with the same problem, they may actually be talking past each other, addressing different matters. In recent years, as we shall see in Chapter 6, there has been some recognition of these differences, and small beginnings have been made in improving communication between the two disciplines and in removing the obstacles to interdisciplinary research.

Cultural Relativism Versus Ethnocentrism

One important aspect of the comparativist perspective is often spoken of as "cultural relativism." As a point of view, it must be opposed to "ethnocentrism." In field research, cultural relativism means not assuming, wittingly or unwittingly, the superiority of one's own society and culture. It also means that one must expect that the behavior of people in an alien society—particularly one previously unstudied—will be full of surprises, of attitudes and behaviors not to be readily predicted or anticipated. Fieldworkers experience culture shock; they may commit serious errors in interpersonal relationships, thus risking the whole research enterprise, and, on rare occasions, even their lives.

Methodologically, this element of the unanticipated has additional implications. It means that the best-laid research plans may turn out to be faulty and need to be modified as the study progresses. It means that only rarely is enough background information available prior to fieldwork to construct the types of experiments, interview schedules, and other devices readily used by psychologists and sociologists in their home societies. The anthropologist, then, must ever be alert to the need to deviate from a preestablished research plan, to take advantage of unanticipated opportunities in the field situation, and to improvise in the face of unanticipated complexities. The behavior of the people studied must be understood in its own terms, in the context of the institutions, values, and meanings of their particular culture.

In culture-and-personality studies, cultural relativism is a subject to which we shall have frequent occasion to return. It strikes, among other things, directly at
the question, "what behavior is normal?" It has bearing on such issues as deviancy and psychopathology, norms of child development, perception and cognition, and many more.

"Psychologizing Anthropology"

Much, if not all, social and cultural anthropology is, in Spindler's terms, "psychologizing" anthropology. This fact has been pointed out most emphatically by critics of psychological anthropology, such as Marvin Harris (1968:395–396) who sees a lurking mentalistic cast in most ethnographic monographs, even in the work of the most antipsychological, usually the British social anthropologists.

Some British social anthropologists have themselves been aware of this tendency to bootleg psychological concepts into their analyses of ethnographic data. One of them, I. M. Lewis, has commented on this trend in the work of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and his intellectual descendants, noting their "phobic reaction to psychoanalysis and psychology" (Lewis 1977:2). At the same time, he himself vigorously attacks "the American Culture and Personality school, with its prostitution of anthropological ideas and materials" (1977:5), ridiculing what he calls the "excesses" of this school. Having thus paid his dues to his fraternity, he goes on to present a most spirited defense of the need for a psychological approach to anthropological investigations:

It is simply no longer good enough to pretend that the protective posture of blissful ignorance . . . still entitles us to ignore what our colleagues in these adjacent fields have to say about the emotions and the motives we so carelessly impute to our informants . . . When we assert that customs and institutions significantly modify people's feelings or expect significant effects on their emotions we must be prepared to seek the best possible independent evidence [that is, from psychological research]. . . . We must also be much more explicitly aware of the psychological status of our own interpretative assumptions and so be better equipped to assess their value and plausibility (Lewis 1977:14).

Although one must assume that Lewis would not call himself a psychological anthropologist, he makes it clear that he thinks it better to utilize an acknowledged, explicit psychological frame of reference than a covert, "commonsense" approach.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The study of culture and personality grew up in the context of U.S. cultural anthropology in the second quarter of this century, when psychoanalysis was becoming increasingly influential in the United States. Psychoanalysis, in more or less modified form, had for a long time the principal psychological influence in this field of anthropology.

Hallowell (1954) has shown common origins for psychology and anthropology about one hundred years earlier, in the first half of the nineteenth century. A full development of common interests, however, only came later under the impact of Darwin's work. For example, much of the earliest German anthropology, such as that of T. Waitz and A. Bastian, was psychologically oriented. This early psychology was a social psychology. In this sense E. B. Tylor's (1871:1) famous definition of culture is eminently both social and psychological: "Culture," he states, is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." It is social, for it deals with "man as a member of society," not as a unique or isolated individual. It is psychological, because it involves the acquisition (or learning) of patterns of behavior, such as customs, capabilities, and habits, and because it includes cognitive orientations such as knowledge, belief, art (both a set of skills and a body of aesthetic values), and law (values and methods of social control).

Darwin's theory of evolution dealt not only with the evolution of anatomical structures, but also with the evolution of behavior, as shown in his Descent of Man (1871) and in the Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872). This dimension of Darwinian anthropology had to wait for another three-quarters of a century to be developed.

Another area of early development of psychological anthropology was the work of W. H. R. Rivers, the British psychologist, who participated in the Torres Straits Expedition in 1898, studying the psychology of vision (visual acuity, color vision, color vocabulary, reactions to visual illusions) among the native populations. Similar interests were being developed at the turn of the century in Germany as well by the psychologist Wilhelm Stern and the anthropologist Richard Thurnwald, who worked in what were then the German South Seas colonies. These early comparative studies in perception and cognition also had to wait until the second half of the twentieth century to be taken up again systematically.

One of the most famous early attempts to link psychology and anthropology is W. Wundt's monumental Volkerpsychologie (1900–1920). This study was a massive undertaking, seeking to work out a psychological history of humankind in the context of cultural differences. ("Folk psychology," incidentally, is rather an inadequate and unfortunate translation of the title which may be better expressed as ethnic psychology). It is interesting that Wundt, the father of "scientific" (laboratory) psychology, spent the last twenty years of his life on this essentially historical, ethnographic, and philosophical enterprise.

Hallowell (1954:168) has noted that G. Stanley Hall, an American student of Wundt's, "was a key figure in the early promotion in the United States of anthropology and child psychology as well as psychoanalysis." In 1888, he brought Franz Boas to Clark University, where he began his long career of teaching anthropology. Hall was also the author of a book on adolescence, and in accord with the intellectual climate of the day, he saw adolescence as one stage in the development of the individual, which, like other such stages, recapitulates
the evolutionary development of mankind. We shall have occasion to return to
this evolutionary recapitulation theory in Chapter 2. Here it is interesting to note,
that almost forty years after Boas came to Clark University, he wanted Margaret
Mead to study the adolescence of girls in Samoa. Writing to her in 1925, before
her departure, he said

One question that interests me very much is how the young girls react to the restraint
of custom . . . I am not at all clear in my mind in how far similar conditions [various
expressions of rebelliousness] may occur in primitive society and in how far the desire
for independence may be simply due to our modern conditions and to a more strongly
developed individualism (Mead 1972:138).

The publication in 1928 of Mead’s study, Coming of Age in Samoa: A psychological
study of primitive youth for Western Civilization, is generally cited as marking
the beginning of the field of culture and personality. The book is also a fine
example of what A. F. C. Wallace (1963:42) has called “the anecdotal veto,” for
Mead found that, contrary to the theory then generally popular in this country,
the universal biological changes of adolescence are not everywhere associated
with social and psychological storm and stress. The universal rule is disproved
by a single negative instance.

Aside from the substance of Mead’s findings and the landmark character of the
publication, a number of other points concerning this study deserve mention.
Mead herself has discussed in some detail how she came to make the study and
her preparation (or rather lack of preparation) for it, from the perspective of many
later field trips and close to fifty years as an anthropologist (Mead 1972). These
important pages should now be read together with the earlier book that they so
greatly illuminate. We know that the cross-cultural test of a Western psychologi-
cal hypothesis was Boas’ idea, and this fits well with remarks he made at Clark
University, in 1909, on the historical occasion of the visit there by Freud and Jung:

We [anthropologists] are endeavoring to elucidate the events which have led to the
formation of human types, past and present . . . We are also trying to determine the
psychological laws which control the mind of man everywhere, and that may differ
in various racial and social groups (Boas 1911, cited in Hallowell 1954:188).

A second notable feature of this first of Mead’s many studies is the influence on
her methods and approach of contemporary psychology, such as her attempt to
use modified intelligence tests (Mead 1928, Appendix V), and an absence of any
influence of psychoanalysis at that time, in spite of the fact that there is a good
deal of talk of sex and sexual experimentation in descriptions of Samoan adoles-
cence. Finally, another important feature was that, by emphasizing the lesson to
be drawn for her home society from this study, Mead laid the groundwork for
the popularization of anthropology and indeed for the later development of
applied anthropology.

Mead concludes that rebelliousness and psychological stress is absent in Sa-
moan girls not only because there is no conflict over sex, but also because there
is a lack of emphasis on achievement, a lack of choices to be made, and a general
shallowness of affect. Y. Barnouw (1973:132) has pointed out that others have
found evidence of unconscious conflict in other South Sea cultures and has
criticized Mead for not using personality tests, but rather relying on intuitive,
descriptive presentation. Needless to say, the tests were not available in 1925.
Moreover, although absence of overt rebellion and conflict does not deny the
possible presence of unconscious conflict and hostility, it is also true that the
Western hypothesis of the relation between physiological adolescence and storm
and stress was based on gross evidence of such disturbances, not on subtle studies
of individual adjustment. It would be interesting to test Mead’s findings by
seeking out other societies where there is a lack of competitiveness or a lack of
choices to be made by adolescents, and making a systematic comparison of adolescent adjustment with modern methods of research. The principal difficulty,
however, is that nowadays a society of such relative stability and tranquility as
the Samoa of the 1920s will be hard to find! It is, of course, always easy to look
back after the passage of fifty years and to suggest how work could have been
improved. Undoubtedly the same will be said in the future of the work of present-
day anthropologists! We shall have to keep this caution in mind as we review
studies that have been instrumental in bringing about the present state of our
science.

In her 1928 study Mead dealt with a specific, rather narrow question: the
relationship between cultural factors and the psychological aspects of female
adolescence. The problem quickly came to be broadened in Mead’s own work,
in that of Ruth Benedict, and of others, to become a general question about the
relationship between culture and the psychological characteristics of people who
live according to the ways of that culture.

**Group Differences**

Underlying this formulation is a much older question: what are the differences
between the people of one society and those of another, and how can we account
for them? Salvador de Madariaga (1928) had treated this subject brilliantly in his
book Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards (1969 [orig. 1928]). Ruth Benedict, a
little later, compared Zuni, Kwakiutl, and Doutuan in Patterns of Culture (1961
[orig. 1934]). Over the centuries, in fact, much has been written about the differ-
ences in the “temperament,” the “genius,” the Zeitgeist or the “national charac-
ter” of various peoples, societies, or civilizations. The famous handwriting expert,
Klara Roman, observed:

Just as national flavor marks gait and voice, speech and gesture among the people
of a given nation, so national characteristics appear also in writing style. The differ-
ences between the emotional expressiveness of Latins, the rigid, disciplined behavior
That they differ, in some significant ways, appears to be a commonsense observation. Yet are claims of such differences more than mere ethnocentric judgments of one group by another, more than stereotypes? Whatever the differences may be, how are they to be explained? By what factors are they caused? By climate, as Montesquieu had thought? By differences in their cultures, as Mead, Benedict, and the culture-and-personality anthropologists came to argue? But, and this was a major difficulty to which we shall have to return, how do we account for the differences in culture in the first place? Furthermore, if the differences are indeed not innate (or "racial") but cultural and learned, we must ask, how are they learned?

Thus culture and personality inherited its central problem, the identification of distinctive personality patterns of different societies with different cultures, from a long tradition of social philosophers and world travelers, from Herodotus on. In the culture-and-personality literature these differences have been termed variously temperament or modal or basic personality structure. Some sociologists, and some anthropologists as well, have spoken of national or social character. Yet a survey of the anthropological literature will reveal that relatively few studies have sought to establish such overall patterns for individual cultures and societies, and these studies, it must be admitted, have as a whole not been particularly successful. As we shall see in Chapter 3, these studies have suffered from a variety of methodological difficulties and have drawn much critical fire.

The vast bulk of the literature, quite to the contrary, has been primarily concerned with either a broader or a narrower scope. The broader scope involves the evolutionary trends that have brought about the development of a generic and distinctive human personality structure. Hall, in particular, saw such a personality structure as the result of behavioral evolution and as characteristic of a distinctively human mode of existence. Although these concerns go back to Darwin, research in this area has been quickening in recent years and has been producing interesting results. We shall deal with these matters in Chapter 2.

Individual Differences

Studies of narrower scope have dealt with more limited problems than the assessment of the basic personality structure exhibited by an entire society, however small. From the beginning, some specialists in culture and personality have shown a considerable interest in the unique individual. The importance of the study of the individual and of individual differences is brilliantly spelled out in Sapir's pathbreaking paper "Why Cultural Anthropology Needs the Psychiatrist" (1938).

This concern with the individual and with individual differences was at least in part a reaction against the many anthropological descriptions of tribal societies in which we read that "The Eskimo believe . . ." or "the Ganda do . . .", as if individual differences did not exist and as if normative statements actually did describe, social and cultural reality. This pattern of reporting in the early years of anthropological fieldwork developed from the frequent need to reconstruct partly vanished ways of life by using a small number of informants who reported on what have come to be termed "memory cultures." When emphasis came to be placed on direct observation and on the collection of information from a range of persons, then variations among those interviewed and observed began to stand out.

Concern with the individual has led to the collection of a large number of personal documents and life histories. These documents often provide startling insights into the experience of life and of the world as seen by a member of a society whose ways are strange and unfamiliar to us. However, because of the fact that they are about unique individuals, with their idiosyncrasies and personal perceptions, it is often difficult to know what part of these perceptions and experiences are shared by other members of their societies. We receive a glimpse into an alien world, but may not be sure just what we see. The task is generally complicated by the fact that those whose biographies and autobiographies we read are likely to be exceptional individuals in their own societies. It remains for us to discover in what ways they are representative.

The problem may be illustrated by autobiographical writings from the United States, which we read while assuming—only in part correctly—that we know all about the cultural and social elements, looking as we read primarily for the particular and unique. Margaret Mead's autobiography, Blackberry Winter (1972), is a case in point. It tells us a great deal about U.S. culture and society in the twentieth century while focusing on the life of one exceptional woman. Like most other life histories, it tells us not what is typical in a given society, but rather what is possible. However unusual a given life may be, however atypical in a statistical sense, still it could and did take place in this particular society, at that particular period in time. Would it be conceivable in some other society or in the same society at a different moment of its history? Cultures make possible and facilitate: they set obstacles and establish limits. They do not fully determine personal character, choices, actions, or experiences. As L. L. Langness (1965b) points out, although many life histories have been published, they remain a rich and generally untapped vein for cultural analysis.

The anthropologist, as a student of culture, is interested in individual differences not as ends in themselves but as raw material for the construction of cultural patterns. Culture, after all, is an abstraction that cannot be observed. We observe human behavior; we collect information on the experiences, attitudes, and perceptions of human individuals. We then analyze this information in a search for regularities, patterns, or themes. In short, we look at the information we collect as a basis for predicting behavior. I do not mean the kind of prediction in which political pollsters or market researchers engage. Rather, if I have figured out how a given pattern of interaction works, I should have a reasonable chance of predicting what the response to a given bit of behavior will be.
Let me give two very small examples. The rules that govern the use of the handshake in greeting differ in the United States and France, a difference that is greater among women than among men. Until the Frenchwoman visiting the United States has mastered the American pattern, she will not be able to predict the response to her proffered hand, and a series of comic or embarrassing mis-timings will result. Another example: While I was conducting fieldwork in a rural region of Haiti, I had learned something about behavior attributed to spirits. One night I heard a neighbor speak in his sleep, and half asleep myself, I guessed this behavior would be interpreted as the speech of spirits rather than as human sleep talk. I was gratified to discover the following morning that this view was indeed the subject of excited comments in the hamlet. Until we discover such regularities, we find it difficult to survive in a human group, for smooth interactions with others depend to a large extent on our ability to predict their responses to our words and actions.

Yet the implicit and explicit rules that govern behavior in a given society vary in degree of stringency. The discovery of the range of permissible individual differences is as important as the discovery of central tendencies. It is this range of variation that the personal documents help us to see. Ideally, a series of such documents would be required for each culture that we wish to examine in this light. Other differences in the behavior and the attitudes among actors have to do, not with personal variations and individual uniqueness, but rather with the place of the given individual in the society and in the network of relations with others. Behavior appropriate for men and women, for adults and children, for specialists in a given activity, among brothers or brothers-in-law, for kin and nonkin: all of these illustrate patterns of diversity.

THE SPECIAL PERSPECTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The study of how prescribed or normative behavior contrasts to actual and variable behavior is not unique to psychological anthropology. It may be carried on by students of social structure, role analysts, political anthropologists, and a host of other social and behavioral scientists outside of anthropology. Psychological anthropology deals to a considerable extent with the same data as other divisions of social and cultural anthropology, and several neighboring disciplines as well.

The difference between psychological anthropology and other specialized divisions of our discipline is one of perspective, not, initially, one of data. First of all, we address the psychological and psychodynamic elements in human behavior explicitly, not merely as afterthoughts. Second, we start from the observation that the behavior we deal with is learned, taught, invented, or modified by individuals. We must therefore ask what we can discover about these processes of learning, teaching, inventing, and modifying as they occur in particular cultural contexts.

This perspective has drawn anthropologists into the study of socialization and child development, and hence into questions of cross-cultural differences as well as regularities.

As we noted earlier, psychological interests were deeply rooted in the Boasian tradition and, even earlier, in most of the anthropology of the nineteenth century. However, how one approaches these and related questions depends to a considerable extent on one's views of personality and personality processes on the one hand, and on one's view of culture on the other. A. I. Hallowell, for example, deals first of all with a generic human nature, a human "personality structure whose genesis lies in social interaction." In this view, the individual functions as a psychobiological whole, a total personality. Behavior has a structural basis, but this structuralization has arisen out of experience and cannot, therefore, be reduced to an inherited organic structure . . . the distinctive psychological organization of the human being . . . is just as much a function of his membership in a social group as it is a function of his inherited organic equipment (Hallowell 1974 [orig. 1950]:8).

If we take this statement as our starting point, we must then speak, first of all, of the generic human personality structure, shared by all members of our species. Second, we must look at the differences in the types of experiences provided to individuals by different cultural groups, and how they lead to personality patterns that vary from group to group. However, since experiences as well as genetic endowment are never alike for any two individuals, we find that groups are, indeed, made up of unique personalities. We shall keep returning to this point: What is the range of variations tolerated by given cultures?

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Psychological anthropology is a broad field that includes a variety of topics, and individual specialists have tended to seek out and develop their own particular areas of interest within it. This book is designed to survey this field, and to introduce the student to its diverse subjects and research problems. In doing so, we shall be covering some well-trodden territory and also approach certain frontiers that are treated more rarely in books of this type, but which increasingly have made claims on our attention. We shall find that some topics that were central to the field in its beginnings, such as attempts to identify and describe the normative personality types of individual societies, have tended to recede somewhat into the background, as other interests have moved to the fore. Among these new interests are altered states of consciousness.

We shall begin quite literally at the beginning, by dealing with evolution (Chapter 2). Since the term "evolution" is used in several different senses by anthropologists, we shall need to examine three that have important implications.
for our field: behavioral evolution, classical theory of cultural evolution, and contemporary approaches to cultural evolution. However, we shall not review the fossil record and the evidence of human paleontology, which are more properly treated by physicalanthropologists. A review of the various meanings of "evolution" will help us to establish a framework for the analysis of both our common human nature and of the factors that lead to group differences.

We shall then move to a discussion of group differences and of the principal studies that have dealt with this broad subject (Chapter 3). Because it has been claimed often that group differences in personality are the outcome of the child-training practices that characterize particular cultures, we next turn to this topic (Chapter 4). As mentioned earlier, over the years cross-cultural studies of child training have become one major focus of psychological anthropology. Such research is also of great interest to anthropologists of education, students of child development, and workers in a number of other fields. Nowadays studies of child training are often pursued without any attempts at linking what happens in childhood to personality characteristics that are said to be typical of a given society. Instead, child training may be related to the subsistence economy of the society, the family structure, the religious beliefs, or other cultural features. Often, too, knowledge about child training is seen as important and valuable enough in itself to merit special attention.

In order to be able to discuss the relationship between personality and culture as separate variables, many researchers have felt it necessary to make use of methods and techniques by which personality could be assessed. A variety of such methods have been used in cross-cultural studies, and they will be our next concern (Chapter 5). We shall see that some methods used in earlier years are now less popular, whereas some newer approaches are still in experimental stages. Because there are differences in what researchers are looking for when they speak of "personality," it is not surprising that they have employed different methods of assessing it.

The tool kit of the psychological anthropologist has long contained items borrowed from clinical psychology. The psychologists themselves have entered the cross-cultural field more recently. Since World War II, however, and increasingly as time goes on, a field of cross-cultural psychology has grown up. We shall look at what has been going on there under the heading of "Perception and Cognition" (Chapter 6). These are topics that psychologists have long treated in the laboratory, and that anthropologists have approached in their fieldwork, but they have done so quite differently. The contrasts between the two disciplines have to do both with methods of research and with the formulation of the problems under investigation.

We next turn to an area of human experience that generally has been neglected by psychological anthropology—altered states of consciousness. Chapter 7 attempts to fill a major gap in the literature of psychological anthropology. We shall discover that altered states of consciousness play a major role in the operation of human societies, as well as in the functioning of individuals. They provide a source for the perception of certain aspects of the world and for how people think about themselves and others. We shall be looking at ethnographic data here, and not at neurophysiology. Although a good deal has been published on these subjects, the neurophysiology of altered states is still poorly understood. We know something about the actions of certain drugs, but little about other types of states. Instead, we have been offered speculations based on limited laboratory research on matters such as differences in the operations of the right and left hemispheres of the brain. At present, the speculations are by far more extensive than the research by which they are inspired.

In part because the theories of culture and personality initially drew heavily on psychoanalysis and clinical psychology, the language in which the earliest studies in this field were couched often appeared to carry clinical connotations. At the same time, the work was often set in the context of a debate about cultural relativity. As a result, it frequently involved questions about the quality of personality functioning, normalcy and deviancy, and health and adjustment. In this setting, much information was collected on deviant individuals and how various societies dealt with them. In more recent years, some psychiatrists have taken a lively interest in certain aspects of these questions, and have raised some issues of their own. For example, they have asked whether mental illnesses exist that are specific to certain cultures. We have also witnessed the development of a field of medical anthropology. In this area, as well as in transcultural psychiatry, there has been much interest in the theories of illness and the methods of treatment to be found in traditional cultures. These and related subjects will be our concerns in Chapter 8.

A theme that runs through much of this volume is culture change and its psychological implications. In Chapter 9 we address this topic directly. It brings us full circle to the beginning, because our first concern, evolution, represents a theoretical approach to certain kinds of change. Although change is indeed ever present in human affairs, modernization and Westernization involve particular psychological issues of motivation and adaptation for Third World peoples.

Rapid change is central to life in our own society. It appears wherever we may turn, in virtually all social and cultural contexts. It is therefore appropriate that, in looking at psychological anthropology, we note how it, too, has changed and developed over time. In various parts of this book a place is reserved for the history of the discipline, as it is revealed in the development of approaches to given problems. Science is a continuous self-correcting enterprise, and answers are never final. Therefore, it we were to limit ourselves to an assessment of the field as it is "now" (meaning, say, during the five years prior to this writing) we would be limiting and handicapping our understanding. It is only by looking back over a longer period of time, and charting the course of developments, that we can hope to make sense of the changes that have occurred in the field.

Students in the United States may be reluctant to look at the past, preferring to ask, "What do we know now? Where do we go from here? Never mind how we got here." This attitude reflects a long antihistorical tradition in this country.

What is Psychological Anthropology?
It constitutes a rejection of the past in favor of the present and, even more, of the future. It has often been said that the United States is a nation of immigrants, who left the Old World behind in order to build a new life here for the tomorrow of their children. In the consumer society of the 1960s and early 1970s, we often lived the new life today at the expense of tomorrow. Yet in the late 1970s some changes seem to have taken place in outlook. The interest stirred by the bicentennial observances in 1975-1976, the growth of concern for ethnic identities and ethnic heritage, the fascination with family histories and genealogies in the wake of the fabulous success of Alex Haley’s Roots (as a book and as a TV dramatization), the sustained interest in folklore and folk traditions sparked by the Foxfire Books—these and a hundred other items are all signs of a change in our attitude toward the past. This change also appears to be related to a reevaluation of earlier, optimistic projections of a science-fiction type of future. Certainly the energy crisis has helped to bring about a startled recognition of the finite nature of world resources, and it has been one significant factor in changing attitudes toward the past as well as the future.

As A. I. Hallowell (1976 [orig. 1965]) remarked, the history of anthropology is itself an anthropological problem. We may ask, for example, in what social and cultural context culture and personality, and later psychological anthropology, developed. What are the social factors to which these intellectual developments constituted a response? We cannot hope to answer such questions fully, but we need to be alert to them. Our concern is with the past not as an end in itself, but only as it helps us to answer questions concerning the development of ideas and research approaches.

Culture and personality, as a subfield of cultural anthropology, had its beginnings in the 1920s, and gained momentum in the 1930s and 1940s, when it reached its peak of popularity. Since then it has undergone a variety of changes and ramifications. Its earliest successes must surely be seen in the light of the crises of the larger society within which it developed: the years of the Great Depression and the social problems of the 1930s, the rise of fascism abroad, and then the upheaval of World War II. In more recent years, interest in altered states of consciousness, which was an oddity in 1960, has grown as a result of the timeliness of this subject in our own society. After all, scientific disciplines do not develop in a social and cultural vacuum; they respond to the challenges of their society.

At present, psychological anthropology is a mature part of our discipline. Yet considering this field simply as a subject matter area would be a serious error. Rather, we will gain in understanding if we view it as an integrating orientation that allows us to pull together data from a broad variety of sources. In this sense, the work of the psychological anthropologist complements that of other specialists, such as those whose primary concern is with primatology, human evolution, or cultural ecology. We must seek out these connections, for our emphasis is placed explicitly on a holistic view of culture, one that seeks to understand culture as a system of interrelated parts.

The history of psychological anthropology teaches us another point as well. As we look back, we see that it, like other branches of science, does not provide timeless, fixed answers to our questions. It does not resolve problems "once and for all." We shall see that many of the questions posed in the beginning of our study have not been answered in the form in which they were stated originally. Rather, as work proceeded, the questions were reformulated over and over again. Instead of answers, in fact, we have achieved better questions. Science, moreover, has a curious spiral character. We come back again and again to old questions in new dress. Often enough, the investigators themselves are only dimly aware that they are "discovering" a problem that was, in fact, dealt with a long time ago, albeit in a different context and through different methods and approaches. What appears new and original is often quite old.

With these remarks in mind, we may now begin our study of psychological anthropology by starting at the beginning, with a look at evolution, the many meanings of that word, and the significance of the several types of evolutionary theory for psychological anthropology.

NOTES

1. The observations in the United States and Haiti are my own. For the Peruvian observation I am indebted to my husband, Paul H. Bourguignon.
2. Note the comment made by President Carter in Texas (June 23, 1978) that he would "not let the Soviet Union push us around."
3. Wylie’s original study of Peyrane was first published in 1957. He has since returned to the village twice after lapses of 10 and of 25 years. In epilogues to later editions of his book he reports on the transformations that had taken place during the intervening years, as well as on the continuities. He notes that child training is among the most stable aspects of culture in this French village.
4. For a critical review of the research design used by Mead in this study, see Brim and Spain (1974).
5. See Langness (1965b) for an impressive bibliography, which provides chronological groupings of publications. See also Mandelbaum (1973). For some specific examples, see Jones (1972), Lame Deer and Erdoes (1972), and P. J. Wilson (1975). The use of the life history in psychological anthropology is treated in Chapter 5, which deals with methods of assessing personality.
6. See Mandelbaum (1973) for some methodological suggestions.
7. Students wishing to pursue these matters further may turn to the work of psychologists such as Robert Ornstein (1972) and Charles Tart (1972).